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Introduction
On August 14, 2002, at a press conference in Washington, DC, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an exiled Iranian opposition group, drew worldwide attention when it publicly accused Iran of clandestinely developing nuclear weapons. Alireza Jafarzadeh, then-U.S. media spokesperson for the NCRI, described two "top secret" nuclear facilities being constructed in Iran at Natanz and Arak under the guise of front companies involved in the procurement of nuclear material and equipment.
1 Noting that media attention had focused on
Iran's publicly declared civilian facilities, Jafarzadeh claimed that "in reality, there are many secret nuclear programs at work in Iran without knowledge of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), " the international body responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with safeguards obligations under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
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Nearly 3 months before the NCRI's press conference, the U.S. Government reportedly briefed the IAEA on Iran's clandestine nuclear activities. 3 The IAEA had received briefings from several member states since the early 1990s that indicated possible undeclared nuclear activi- Governors-the Agency's main policymaking body composed of 35 member states-delayed the decision to find Iran in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement. 4 The process for determining non-compliance depends on the technical and legal findings of the IAEA Secretariat-the Agency's technical arm-and the political judgments made by the IAEA Board. However, the lack of an established definition of non-compliance makes the decisionmaking process one of the most challenging tasks faced by the IAEA, which has a statutory obligation to report non-compliance to the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly. After postponing the promised visit for 4 months, Aghazadeh invited ElBaradei, accompanied by IAEA safeguards officials, to Iran during the third week of February 2003. 8 At the meeting in Tehran, Aghazadeh and other Iranian authorities admitted to the IAEA that the facility under construction at Natanz was a uranium enrichment plant. They also confirmed that a heavy water production plant was under construction at Arak. The next day, the IAEA inspection team visited Natanz and found two main facilities: an above ground centrifuge pilot fuel enrichment plant ready to begin operation, and a large underground facility intended to host a fuel enrichment plant with a design capacity of more than 50,000 centrifuges. In addition,
IAEA inspectors verified that Iran had imported previously undeclared quantities of uranium hexafluoride (UF6)-the feedstock for enrichment-and other uranium compounds. Some of this material had been secretly converted to uranium metal, which can be used as fuel for certain types of reactors that did not exist in Iran, but is also a stepping stone to converting highenriched uranium (HEU) into metal, which is the form used in nuclear weapons.
In continued discussions with Iranian authorities, IAEA inspectors inquired about the possible conduct of enrichment activities at a workshop belonging to the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran, one of the front companies the NCRI claimed Iran was using to procure centrifuges under the guise of a watch manufacturing company. Senior Iranian officials insisted that
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IAEA Decision to Find Iran in Non-Compliance, 2002-2006
The IAEA was established in 1957-13 years before the entry-into-force of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT)-as the world's center of scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Agency's relationship with the United Nations (UN) is regulated by special agreement; it reports annually to the UN General Assembly and, when appropriate, can report directly to the Security Council regarding states' compliance with their NPT safeguards agreements, as well as on matters relating to international peace and security.
Safeguards and Verification
The IAEA is widely recognized as the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring the compliance of NPT state parties with their safeguards agreements through the application of international safeguards. Verification measures include on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation. The NPT requires all non-nuclear-weapon states to conclude a "full-scope" 18 The U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA, Kenneth
Brill, argued that "the facts already established" justified an immediate finding of non-compliance by Iran with its safeguards obligations. 19 However, with its influence constrained by the General, should enable the immediate situation to be resolved by the IAEA Board, " rather than reporting the matter to the UNSC.
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In their effort to conclude the Tehran Joint Declaration in October, the E-3 foreign ministers deviated from the terms of the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board in September, which called on Iran to "suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities." 26 According to ElBaradei, the problem was that the E-3 foreign ministers and their Iranian counterparts could not agree on how exactly to define the scope of enrichment activities to be suspended. 27 Meeting one-on-one with Iranian negotiator Rouhani just 4 days before the Tehran Joint Declaration was concluded, ElBaradei made clear his own view that to comply with the IAEA's suspension requirements, Tehran would have to suspend the introduction of UF6 into centrifuges. 28 This privately communicated definition of suspension, which was more restrictive than the language used by the IAEA Board, was apparently not known to the E-3 foreign ministers and indeed was not made public at the time. And since the E-3 foreign ministers sought a broad definition of suspension to serve as a confidence-building measure in any case, the Tehran Joint Declaration was not explicit on the IAEA's technical definition of suspension. 29 Because of this ambiguity, disagreements over the scope of "enrichment and reprocessing activities" persisted, and Iran continued to test its uranium conversion processes, including those that produced UF6, until 2004. 
IAEA Decision to Find Iran in Non-Compliance, 2002-2006
ElBaradei received a letter from AEOI chief Aghazadeh declaring that Iran was "commencing a new phase of confidence and cooperation. " 30 The letter admitted to many activities that Iran previously denied, including the testing of centrifuges with nuclear material at the Kalaye Electric workshop and the use of additional undeclared nuclear material in some 113 uranium conversion experiments carried out between 1995 and 2000. 31 In a statement to the press, ElBaradei welcomed Iran's decision to provide a more comprehensive picture of its nuclear fuel cycle activities.
He also encouraged Iran to conclude an Additional Protocol to ensure that both its declared and undeclared nuclear activities were placed under IAEA safeguards. The United States, which was in close contact with the E-3, reacted cautiously to the outcome of the Tehran Joint Declaration, calling it a "positive step" if Iran were to comply with the agreement. trial-scale enrichment capability was based largely on the production of gas centrifuges, but it had also conducted laboratory-scale experiments with laser isotope separation techniques to enrich uranium. Iran admitted that "it [had] produced small amounts of LEU [low-enriched uranium] using both centrifuge and laser enrichment processes, and that it had failed to report a large number of conversion, fabrication and irradiation activities involving nuclear material, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium. " 33 ElBaradei concluded, however, that "there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities . . . were related to a nuclear weapons program. " 34 The use of the term non-compliance was carefully left out to avoid referral of Iran to the UNSC for possible sanctions and other measures to enforce compliance. "In the case of Iran, " ElBaradei later observed, "I had long been careful to avoid using the word noncompliance, opting instead for synonyms such as breach or violation, so as not to prejudice the Board. " 35 The United States was not pleased with ElBaradei's failure to explicitly cite non-compliance. U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Brill sharply rebuked the IAEA for "dismissing important facts that had been disclosed by its own investigation as irrelevant to the question of whether Iran has a nuclear weapons program. " 36 Although the United States wanted to refer Iran to the UNSCas a strict application of its safeguards agreement required-China, Russia, and the 118-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) preferred to throw their weight behind the Tehran Joint Declaration in hopes of resolving the nuclear dispute at the IAEA. In September 2003, the NAM announced the creation of a Vienna Chapter, which coincided with Iran's nuclear dossier being brought before the IAEA. 37 The Vienna Chapter provided Iran a useful instrument for influencing the NAM's positions on nuclear issues and engineering diplomatic stalemates within the IAEA Board to avoid referral to the UNSC. the IAEA Board's agenda. 47 Iran, on the other hand, accused the E-3 of caving into American "bullying" by drafting the stern resolution. 48 Within days, Iran informed the IAEA that it would remove Agency seals on centrifuge-related equipment and restart the fabrication and testing of centrifuges. 49 The October 2003 Tehran Joint Declaration, which had obtained the partial suspension of Iran's enrichment activities, had now collapsed.
New Suspicions Emerge
By the fall of 2004, new information emerged that revived the debate over the transparency of Iran's ongoing nuclear activities. One major suspicion related to indications that Iran was conducting research and development activities using P-2 centrifuges at Lavizan-Shian, a neighborhood in northeastern Tehran. 50 The U.S.-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)-a think tank that focuses on nuclear proliferation-publicly released the first satellite images of the Lavizan-Shian site showing that several buildings and laboratories had been razed to the ground and that top soil had been removed. 51 The images suggested that Iran was attempting to conceal its activities from IAEA inspectors. Adding to suspicions, the IAEA had been informed about the possible presence of radiation detection devices, or whole body counters, at Lavizan-Shian. Although the devices were not direct evidence of a nuclear weapons program, their presence was unusual at a site that Iran had not declared as being associated with its nuclear activities. had been based at Lavizan-Shian since 1989 but that no nuclear activities had been carried out at the site. 53 The site was razed in 2004, Iranian authorities claimed, in response to a decision made in connection with a dispute between the municipality of Tehran and the Ministry of Defense. Environmental samples taken from Lavizan-Shian showed no evidence of nuclear material, although ElBaradei pointed out that the detection of nuclear material would be "very difficult in light of the razing of the site. " 54 The IAEA, meanwhile, was quietly investigating another lead, publicly disclosed by ISIS, about a military complex called Parchin, located southeast of Tehran, that was possibly being used for nuclear weapons-related research. 55 According to ElBaradei, the IAEA was aware that Parchin was a military production facility, but it had no evidence that Iran was conducting nuclear-related activities there. 56 The IAEA sought access to
Parchin, but Iran initially denied its requests. Agreement. 58 The Paris Agreement called for negotiations to be launched by a European-Iranian steering committee, which was responsible for setting up working groups on political and security issues, technology and economic cooperation, and nuclear issues, aimed at reaching a long-term framework with Iran to resolve the dispute over its nuclear program. 59 With fresh hopes for a solution, ElBaradei reported on November 15 that Iran had voluntarily agreed to suspend "all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, " this time taking greater care to specify the scope of suspension, including:
■ ■ the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their components ■ ■ the assembly, installation, testing, or operation of gas centrifuges ■ ■ work to undertake any plutonium separation, or to construct or operate any plutonium separation installation, and all tests or production at any uranium conversion installations. 60 The agreement was made in time for the IAEA Board meeting on November 25. Iran agreed to the moratorium on the condition that the E-3 would not support U.S.-led efforts to refer Iran to the UNSC. 61 The IAEA Board welcomed the Paris Agreement, stating in its resolution that Iran's "policy of concealment up to October 2003 resulted in many breaches of its obligations to comply with the NPT, " but again deferred a formal finding of non-compliance in favor of a negotiated agreement. 62 The United States detailed its objections to the resolution in a nine-page explanation of vote.
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Toward a Formal Finding of Non-Compliance
In keeping with the Paris Agreement, during the first half of 2005 no written IAEA safeguards reports on Iran were issued by ElBaradei to the IAEA Board for the first time in 2 years. 64 ElBaradei, with the support of the E-3, decided that oral reports would suffice. 65 In February, Presi- 69 The E-3 therefore struggled to find a formula that would keep talks going without retreating on its position over the enrichment issue. To show its dissatisfaction with the pace of stalled negotiations, on May 9 Iran announced that it had completed its process of feeding about 37 metric tons of natural uranium, or yellowcake, into the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan for testing purposes. 70 Although the E-3 had agreed that Iran could complete the conversion before its suspension as part of the November 2004
Paris Agreement, the move triggered an invitation to talks in Geneva that Iran described as a "last chance" for the Europeans to offer sufficient incentives for halting the resumption of its uranium conversion and enrichment activities. However, the IAEA was unable to establish a definitive conclusion regarding all contamination and could not verify Iranian statements concerning its efforts to import, manufacture, and use P-1 and P-2 centrifuge designs. Although the IAEA made repeated requests for additional information on a range of activities, Iranian cooperation fell short, including in providing access to equipment and information related to the Lavizan-Shian and Parchin sites. After 2 and a half years of intensive investigation, ElBaradei once again called on Iran to expand its transparency and confidence-building measures to "compensate for the confidence deficit" created by two decades of its clandestine nuclear activities. 74 At the meeting of the IAEA Board later that month, the E-3 proposed a draft resolution with the support of the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, and other like-minded countries calling for Iran to be referred to the UNSC. Iran threatened to withdraw from the NPT and claimed it would refuse to sell oil to countries that supported the resolution. 75 China and Russia, in particular, argued that the Iran nuclear dossier could be resolved within the IAEA and opposed its referral to the UNSC. Unwilling to break the Spirit of Vienna by forcing a vote without China and Russia, the E-3 decided to amend the draft resolution to find Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement but removed all references to IAEA referral of Iran to the UNSC. 
WMD Center Case Study 6
In the absence of a statutory definition of non-compliance, the question of whether the IAEA Board should adopt guidelines to assist in its non-compliance determinations has been the subject of debate. 88 Some have suggested that the development of guidelines could assist the Board in clarifying issues and ensure the consistency and credibility of its non-compliance determinations. 89 Others have argued that too much guidance could limit the political discretion afforded to the Board in dealing with safeguards violations on a case-by-case basis. 90 In not adhering to the principle of "zero tolerance"-which ElBaradei himself argued in November Secretariat. With over 2,300 professional support staff, the IAEA Secretariat is responsible for implementing the Agency's programs and activities, including the detection of safeguards violations by member states. The Secretariat is headed by the Director General, the chief administrative officer, and comprises six major departments ranging from safeguards to nuclear safety and security. 4 See appendix 1 of this study for an overview of the IAEA's Secretariat and policymaking bodies. 5 While not a legally authoritative account, the IAEA Safeguards Glossary describes non-compliance as a "violation by a state of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA" and provides several examples including "the failure to declare nuclear material" and the "obstruction of the activities of IAEA inspectors. " IAEA Safeguards Glossary (2001 Edition), International Nuclear Verification Series No. 3, 11-12.
